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I. INTRODUCTION
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions and a handful of
legislative enactments.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Governmental immunity cases continued to dominate the field of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction during the Survey period. In Texas Parks & Wild-
life Department v. Sawyer Trust, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
trust's declaratory-judgment action was barred by sovereign immunity.1
The genesis of this dispute is the rule that "[t]he State of Texas owns the
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law. Partner, Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. 2011).
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soil underlying navigable streams."12 The trust wished to sell sand and
gravel from a portion of a riverbed that crossed property it owned. Fear-
ing that the State would claim ownership and interfere with the sale, the
trust sought a declaratory judgment that the river was not navigable.
When the State's surveyor later determined that the river was in fact nav-
igable, the trust amended its pleadings to allege a takings claim as well. 3
The supreme court rejected all of the trust's claims. 4 The supreme
court first held that the declaratory judgment action was, in reality, a re-
quest to adjudicate title to the disputed riverbed, a claim from which the
State is immune.5 Moreover, because the trust sought only declaratory
and injunctive relief, not compensation, it failed to state a takings claim.6
Nevertheless, the supreme court remanded the case to allow the trust to
further amend its pleadings to assert an ultra vires claim against the offi-
cials who the trust asserted wrongfully laid claim to the riverbed on be-
half of the State.7
The Texas Supreme Court has previously held that if a governmental
entity asserts a claim for affirmative relief, it is not immune from claims
asserted back against it as an offset that are connected with, and properly
defensive to, the government's claim. 8 The novel question in City of Dal-
las v. Albert was what happens when the governmental entity asserts, but
then nonsuits, such a claim for affirmative relief.9 Albert involved a pay
dispute between the City of Dallas and its police officers and firefighters.
Based on competing constructions of a pay ordinance passed by referen-
dum, the officers asserted claims that they had been underpaid, while the
city filed a counterclaim seeking reimbursement for amounts it alleged
had been overpaid. The city subsequently nonsuited its affirmative claim
and argued that it was therefore immune from the officers' claims. 10
In what can only be described as a hollow victory for the plaintiffs, the
Texas Supreme Court rejected the city's immunity argument." In this
regard, the majority opinion held that a nonsuit did not "reinstate" or
"create" immunity from the officers' claims; however, the nonsuit did
mean that the officers could no longer recover on their claims because
there was nothing to offset.12 Justice Hecht dissented, describing the ma-
2. Id.
3. Id. at 387.
4. Id. at 386.
5. Id. at 389-90.
6. Id. at 391-92.
7. Id. at 386, 394. The dissent objected to this part of the decision, reasoning that the
majority was effectively "abolish[ing] the State's immunity from suit[s] to determine title."
Id. at 397 (Hecht, J., dissenting). According to Justice Hecht, "[a]ll a plaintiff must do
[now] is name [a governmental] official as the defendant," as this has the same practical
effect as a suit against the State itself and binds the State to the resulting judgment. Id.
8. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 376-77 (Tex. 2006).
9. City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. 2011).
10. ld. at 370-71.
11. Id. at 371.
12. Id. at 376.
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jority's holding as "extremely convoluted." 13 And Justice Willett com-
plained that the entire majority opinion was advisory, since the case was
being remanded to determine whether a new provision of the Local Gov-
ernment Code waived the city's immunity anyway. 14
The Texas Supreme Court, in Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Yar-
brough, was sharply divided on whether a university professor's claim was
moot after she was granted tenure.15 The professor claimed that her ten-
ure application had been undermined by a department chair's negative
summary of her performance evaluations. Even though she received ten-
ure, she argued that the summary remained in her file and could be used
against her in future personnel decisions. A bare majority of the supreme
court rejected this argument, concluding that the professor's claim did not
present a "substantial controversy ... of sufficient immediacy and real-
ity." 16 The dissent disagreed, noting that the supreme court has previ-
ously held that allegations of this type of "stigmatic injury ... [can be]
sufficient to demonstrate a live controversy." 17
When a plea to the jurisdiction disputes the jurisdictional facts alleged
by the plaintiff, a trial court must utilize a procedure similar to that appli-
cable to summary judgment motions. 18 Unifund CCR Partners v. Watson
serves as a reminder that it is the traditional summary-judgment-motion
procedure, not the no-evidence procedure, that must be followed.19 As
the Amarillo Court of Appeals explained, the defendant must present
evidence that conclusively negates subject matter jurisdiction in order to
impose an evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to establish that a fact issue
exists. 20 The defendant cannot merely deny the existence of the jurisdic-
tional facts and thereby shift the burden to the plaintiff, as is the case with
a no-evidence summary judgment motion.21
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
During the Survey period, Texas courts continued to grapple with the
effect of a party's Internet presence on personal jurisdiction. In
BenMac's Arrowheads Dot Com, LLC v. Williams, the Eastland Court of
Appeals relied exclusively on the out-of-state defendants' ownership of a
website, which included advertising banners for twelve Texas companies
(out of a total of fifty-three advertisers), to support a finding of general
13. Id. at 381 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 383 (Willett, J., dissenting) (citing Tax Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 271.152
(West 2012)).
15. Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 289-290 (Tex. 2011).
16. Id. at 291 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941))
(emphasis added by Texas Supreme Court).
17. Id. at 292-93 (Willett, J., dissenting) (citing Carillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612,
616-17 (Tex. 1972)).
18. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
19. Unifund CCR Partners v. Watson, 337 S.W.3d 922, 926-27 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2011, no pet.).




jurisdiction.22 The court of appeals brushed aside the defendants' argu-
ment that their website was "passive" 23 and was not, therefore, sufficient
to establish minimum contacts with Texas.24 The court reasoned that it
was unnecessary to analyze the degree of interactivity because the ques-
tion was not whether the website itself created sufficient contacts, but
whether it was evidence of the continuous and systematic contacts with
Texas necessary to establish general jurisdiction.25 It is questionable,
however, if this distinction should make any difference to the jurisdic-
tional analysis. More importantly, the court of appeals's ultimate conclu-
sion-that twelve Texas companies advertising on the defendants'
website was sufficient to support general jurisdiction 26-appears to be
unprecedented. Indeed, both the United States Supreme Court and
Texas Supreme Court have previously rejected assertions of general juris-
diction in cases involving far more extensive business activity in Texas
than simply selling advertising space on a website to Texas companies. 27
In contrast to the opinion in BenMac's, the Texas First District Court of
Appeals conducted a thorough analysis of the nature and extent of the
defendants' Texas contacts, including the interactivity of their websites, in
ruling on the special appearances in Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz.2
In this maritime-negligence case, the court of appeals held that general
jurisdiction over one shipping company was lacking, despite its regular
calls upon Texas ports, purchases from Texas vendors, employment of 200
Texas residents over the years, payment of Texas franchise taxes, and
maintenance of a passive website accessible in Texas.2 9 While the other
22. BenMac's Arrowheads Dot Com, L.L.C. v. Williams, 357 S.W.3d 390, 391,394-95
(Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, no pet.). General jurisdiction refers to the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction when the plaintiff's claims against the defendant are unrelated to the
latter's contacts with the forum state. See, e.g., PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 167 (Tex. 2007). Because general jurisdiction means the nonresi-
dent could be required to defend any lawsuit in the forum, it "involves a 'more demanding
minimum contacts analysis."' Id. at 168 (quoting CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595
(Tex. 1996)).
23. A number of Texas courts have adopted the "sliding scale" analysis of personal
jurisdiction based on website presence in the state, which was first articulated in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). See,
e.g., Jackson v. Hoffman, 312 S.W.3d 146, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.); Reiff v. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 700, 705-06 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003 pet. denied). This
analysis examines the degree to which the defendant's website is interactive, with one end
of the spectrum being a "passive" website that is used only for advertising and providing
information, while on the opposite end of the spectrum a nonresident may actually be
doing business in the forum by, for example, entering into a contract with a forum resident
over the Internet. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
24. BenMac's, 357 S.W.3d at 394-95.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19
(1984) (foreign defendant regularly purchased helicopters and related equipment from
Texas vendors and sent pilots and personnel to Texas for training); PHC-Minden, 235
S.W.3d at 170-71 (out-of-state defendant's trips to Texas, payments to multiple Texas ven-
dors, and contracts with three Texas entities were insufficient for general jurisdiction).
28. Cf. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 411-12, 417-18 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 2011, pet. denied), with BenMac's, 357 S.W.3d at 394-95.
29. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d at 408, 4t3.
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shipping company's contacts with Texas were similar, the additional facts
that it was "registered to do business in Texas,. . . maintained a registered
agent for service of process in Texas, and . . . [had] a full-time employee"
in Texas were sufficient to tip the scale in favor of a finding of general
jurisdiction.30
Finally, Wilkerson v. RSL Funding, L.L.C. raised the more unusual
question of whether an out-of-state defendant's mere use of a commercial
website could subject him to jurisdiction in Texas.3 ' In this defamation
case, a California resident posted negative online reviews of the plaintiff,
a financial-services company, which is headquartered in Houston. Al-
though the defendant apparently thought he was posting his comments
on the plaintiff's own website, the reviews were actually on two third-
party websites, Yahoo! and Yelp. In response to his special appearance,
the plaintiff argued that the defendant specifically directed his actions at
Texas because the websites used plaintiff's geographic location as a key
component in their search options.3 2
In reversing the trial court's denial of the special appearance, the Texas
First District Court of Appeals first concluded that a sliding-scale analysis
based on the websites' interactivity was inappropriate in deciding
whether an individual user of someone else's website is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction. 33 The court of appeals then went on to analyze
whether, in posting his reviews, the defendant was purposefully directing
his activities at the State of Texas, Although the Yahoo! and Yelp web
pages contained address listings and other information related to the
plaintiff's business location in Houston, the court of appeals concluded
this did not prove that the defendant's comments were posted in a way
specifically directed at Texas.34
IV. VENUE
During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued two
opinions demonstrating a strong disposition to enforce forum-selection
clauses. In In re Cornerstone Healthcare Holding Group, Inc., the court
of appeals found that a nonsignatory to a forum-selection clause was enti-
tled to enforce the clause under a theory of equitable estoppel.35 The
court recognized that equitable estoppel is typically used against "a non-
signatory plaintiff who seeks the benefits of a contract [but] simultane-
30. Id. at 424-25.
31. Wilkerson v. RSL Funding, L.L.C., No. 01-10-01001-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS
6282, at *14 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2011, pet. filed).
32. Id. at *7.
33. Id. at *14-15.
34. Id. at * 29-30. Characterizing the case as one of the first impressions, the dissent-
ing justice would have held that the defendant subjected himself to jurisdiction in Texas
because he used "the interactive local Yahoo! website for Houston and the interactive Yelp
website for Houston to post allegedly defamatory comments about a local Houston, Texas
business." Id. at *38 (Keyes, J., dissenting).
35. In re Cornerstone Healthcare Holding Grp., Inc., 348 S.W.3d 538, 544-45 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2011, orig. proceeding).
20121
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ously attempt[s] to avoid the contract's" forum-selection clause.36 This
case was different because the plaintiff was a signatory to the note that
contained the forum-selection clause, but the defendant seeking to en-
force the clause was not. Nonetheless, the court held that although the
plaintiff had not expressly filed suit to enforce the note, the plaintiff's
claims were a veiled attempt to gain the benefits of the note by asserting
"intertwined claims" against several parties. 37
In In re FC Stone, LLC, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the plain-
tiff's arguments that a forum-selection clause should not be enforced. 38
First, the court held that although the plaintiff had pled that there was
some evidence of fraud in procuring the contract at issue, those allega-
tions were insufficient to avoid enforcement of the forum-selection
clause.39 Rather, similar to the rule regarding arbitration clauses, a party
cannot avoid the enforcement of a forum-selection clause unless it pleads
that "the specific clause [itself] was the product of fraud or coercion. '40
Second, the court recognized that "[f]orum-selection clauses can be
avoided if the chosen forum is so inconvenient that enforcing the clause
would produce an unjust result. '41 This standard was not satisfied, how-
ever, merely by the presence of parties to the lawsuit who were not inde-
pendently subject to the clause or by the fact that litigation might have to
proceed in two separate forums.42
V. PARTIES
For a number of years, the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
allowed a plaintiff to assert a claim against a person designated as a re-
sponsible third party by the defendant, even if the claim would otherwise
have been barred by limitations, so long as the plaintiff brought the claim
within sixty days of the responsible third-party designation.43 The legisla-
ture closed this perceived (by some) loophole during the Survey period
by repealing this provision.44 In its place, the statute now provides that
"a defendant may not designate ... a responsible third party.., after the
[statute of limitations] ... has expired" on the plaintiff's claim unless the
36. Id. at 544.
37. Id. at 543 (quoting Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Int'l Exploration and
Prod., Inc., 234 S.W.3d 679, 694 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)
("Courts should apply equitable estoppel when a signatory to the contract containing the
forum-selection clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct by both nonsignatories and one or more signatories to the contract.")).
38. In re FC Stone, LLC, 348 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, orig.
proceeding).
39. Id. at 551.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 552.
42. Id.
43. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 971, re-
pealed by Act of May 30, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 5.02, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 757.
44. Act of May 30, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 5.02, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 757.
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defendant has "timely" disclosed that person in its discovery responses.45
These amendments eliminate the possibility of a plaintiff colluding with a
named defendant to have the defendant designate a responsible third
party in order to allow the plaintiff to revive a time-barred claim. And
while the statute tries to prevent defendants from delaying the designa-
tion of responsible third parties so as to prejudice the plaintiff (e.g.,
where the limitations period expires during the time a defendant delays),
there will undoubtedly be many instances in which plaintiffs will file suit
shortly before limitations runs, and any claim against responsible third
parties will be too late, even if they are designated promptly. In these
situations, plaintiffs will simply have to face a trial in which the defendant
points to the "empty chair" that previously would have been occupied by
a responsible third party.
During the Survey period, several cases addressed the differences be-
tween misidentification and misnomer. As a general rule, "misidentifica-
tion arises when two separate legal entities actually exist and a plaintiff
mistakenly sues the entity with a name similar to that of the correct en-
tity."'46 "Misnomer [, however,] arises when a plaintiff sues the correct
entity but misnames it."'47
In Barth v. Bank of America, N.A., the plaintiff sued "Bank of America
Corporation. '48 "Bank of America, N.A. answered, asserting that it had
been . . . 'incorrectly named.'" 49 "At trial, the witnesses referred [to the
defendant] simply" as "Bank of America," except on one occasion when
"Bank of America, N.A.'s corporate representative testified" that the
"actual entity [involved in the dispute]" was "Bank of America National
Association. ' 50 Notably, Bank of America Corporation, the named de-
fendant, was never mentioned in the presentation of the evidence at trial.
"During the ... charge conference . . . ,the trial court granted [the plain-
tiff] a trial amendment to correct the [name of the defendant], but the
liability [issues] submitted to the jury and answered in [the plaintiff's]
favor all [still] referred to Bank of America Corporation. The trial court
rendered judgment against Bank of America, N.A.," but the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals reversed, "holding that the verdict [did] not sup-
port the judgment."'5'
In the Texas Supreme Court, "Bank of America, N.A. argue[d] that
this [was] a case of misidentification, not misnomer. ' 52 The supreme
court first noted that the consequences of misidentification "are generally
harsh," compared to that of misnomer, as courts typically "allow parties
45. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 33.004(d) (West Supp. 2011); see TEX. R.
Civ. P. 194.2(1) (requiring disclosure of "name, address, and telephone number of any per-
son who may be designated as a responsible third party").
46. Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. 1999).
47. Id.







to correct a misnomer so long as it was not misleading. '53 In this case,
the supreme court found that the situation was a "clear case of misno-
mer," that Bank of America, N.A. had not been misled, and that the jury
was not confused about the entity actually involved in the dispute.54
In Nolan v. Hughes, the Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the misno-
mer-versus-misidentification issue in connection with the effect of an
amended pleading on a statute-of-limitations defense. 55 The plaintiff ini-
tially filed suit against "Rolando Lopez and Linda Lopez, owner/opera-
tors of 'Rolando's Mexican Restaurant' a/k/a 'Rolando's Mexican
Restaurant and Club."' Factually, the plaintiff alleged that: (1) she was
injured at a restaurant in Farmersville commonly known as "Rolando's
Mexican Restaurant"; (2) at the time of her injury, the Lopezes owned
"Rolando's Mexican Restaurant"; (3) the Lopezes had subsequently sold
the restaurant to another individual; and (4) "at the time [plaintiff] filed
suit, the Lopezes owned and operated 'another... restaurant' called 'Ro-
lando's Mexican Restaurant' a/k/a 'Rolando's Mexican Restaurant and
Club,' [located] in Bonham. ''56
The plaintiff later amended her petition to also name Dennis Hughes
"as an 'alternative/additional' defendant . . . , operating under the as-
sumed name "'Rolando's Mexican Grill" a/k/a "Rolando's Mexican Res-
taurant."' .57 In this pleading, the plaintiff alleged that "she was injured
at 'Rolando's Mexican Restaurant' a/k/a "Rolando's Mexican Grill,"'
which was owned and operated by the Lopezes when she was injured.
Alternatively, the plaintiff "alleged that on the date she was injured
Hughes operated the restaurant under the assumed names of 'Rolando's
Mexican Restaurant a/k/a Rolando's Mexican Grill.' '' 58 In response,
Hughes filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff's
claims were barred by limitations. Hughes admitted that he operated Ro-
lando's Mexican Grill in Farmersville at the time of the accident, but
claimed that the amended petition did not relate back to the original peti-
tion because this was a matter of misidentification and not misnomer.
The trial court granted Hughes' motion for summary judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed.59
The Dallas Court of Appeals first noted that misnomer and, in more
limited circumstances, misidentification were exceptions to the general
rule that "'an amended pleading adding a new party does not relate back
to the original pleading' to determine whether it is timely to avoid limita-
tions. '60 In particular, in misidentification cases, limitations are only
53. Id. at 876-877 (citing In re Greater Hous. Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d
323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)).
54. Id. at 877.
55. Nolan v. Hughes, 349 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).




60. Id. at 212 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Bailey, 332
S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex. 2011)).
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tolled when "the correct entity had notice of the suit and was not misled
or disadvantaged by the mistake."' 61 The court of appeals held that
"Hughes' summary judgment evidence ... conclusively [established] that
he, not the Lopezes, owned and operated the restaurant ... named as
'Rolando's Mexican Grill' on the day [the plaintiff] was injured, and that
there were two separate legal entities, [owned by] Hughes and the
Lopezes [respectively, with] similar sounding [names] but there was no
business relationship between them."'62 The court found that under these
circumstances, the case involved misidentification (i.e., two separate legal
entities using a similar trade name) and not misnomer.63 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the summary judgment because the plaintiff had not
demonstrated that the correct entity had notice of the suit and was not
misled or disadvantaged by the mistake. 64
VI. PLEADINGS
In re Spooner considered the propriety of a finding that the defendants
had made judicial admissions in their summary judgment motions. 65 In
this medical-negligence action, the defendants moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the plaintiff's "claims were barred by the...
two-year statute of limitations. ' 66 The trial court granted the motions,
but the Texas Supreme Court subsequently reversed and remanded the
case.67 Once back in the trial court, the plaintiff argued that the follow-
ing language, which was contained in the defendants' previously filed
summary judgment motions, constituted judicial admissions:
Since [Walters] began experiencing the pelvic abdominal pain im-
mediately following the tubal ligation and continued to experience
chronic pelvic abdominal pain over the course of nine to ten years
prior to the removal of the sponge, plaintiff could have and should
have known that her condition was related to the tubal ligation sur-
gery in 1995.
It is clear based on the medical records and Ms[sic] Walters' own
testimony that she has had chronic pelvic pain, with recurring urinary
complaints ever since the tubal ligation in 1995 and her persistent
symptoms, and worsening condition (the chronic pain caused anxiety
and depression) were clear signs that something was wrong with Ms.




63. Id. at 214.
64. Id.
65. In re Spooner, 333 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding).
66. Id.




The trial court agreed and entered an order that the defendants had
judicially admitted that the sponge had been retained after the surgery
and was the cause of the plaintiff's chronic pain.69
The Texas First District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that a ju-
dicial admission must be clear, deliberate, and unequivocal. 70 The court
noted that in the context of the prior summary judgment proceeding, the
record reflected that the defendants had offered the statements at issue
solely for the purposes of advancing their limitations argument. Thus, the
record did not support the finding that the defendants had "clearly, delib-
erately and unequivocally stated that the sponge was retained" and was
the actual cause of the plaintiff's injury.71
More surprisingly, the court of appeals also held that the defendants
did not have an adequate remedy on appeal and were therefore entitled
to a writ of mandamus. 72 Although the Texas Supreme Court has in re-
cent years opened the door to a more liberal use of mandamus as a means
to correct certain trial court errors before final judgment, the court of
appeals's holding in Spooner raises the prospect of requests for manda-
mus review of many other pretrial evidentiary rulings, such as the exclu-
sion of an expert witness.73 Indeed, the court of appeals here clearly
recognized that the trial court's order could be reviewed after a final
judgment if necessary and that the additional time and expense associ-
ated with a regular appeal did not, by itself, "justify the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. '74 Nevertheless, the court came to the dubious conclusion
that this particular order would "skew" the trial process "in ways that
[were] unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record" and that manda-
mus was therefore appropriate. 75
VII. DISCOVERY
Several cases during the Survey period articulated limits on a party's
ability to obtain pre-suit depositions under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. 76 For example, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
request of the Harris County Department of Education and four of its
trustees to take pre-suit discovery to investigate grounds for removal of a
county official.77 Because individual citizens cannot maintain an ouster
suit without the joinder of an appropriate state official, they likewise can-
not use Rule 202 to obtain discovery they would have no right to take if
69. Id. at 763.
70. Id. at 764.
71. Id. at 765.
72. Id. at 767.
73. See id. at 765-66 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.
2004)).
74. Id. at 766.
75. Id.
76. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.
77. In re Wolf, 341 S.W.3d 932, 932 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).
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the anticipated suit were filed by the proper party.78
The Texas Supreme Court also refused the requested pre-suit discovery
in In re Does I & 2. 79 There, a party alleged it had been defamed by two
anonymous bloggers and sought pre-suit discovery into their identity
from Google. Upon being served, Google agreed to respond to the sub-
poena duces tecum, and no hearing was held on the Rule 202 petition.
When the bloggers then moved to quash the subpoena, the trial court
denied their motion. The supreme court granted mandamus relief, ex-
plaining that a Rule 202 petition can be granted only if certain findings
are made by the trial court, which did not occur.80 Moreover, the opinion
went on to explain that Rule 202 requires that all potential adverse par-
ties be served with the petition and given notice of the hearing, and the
trial court's failure to make the required findings could not, therefore, be
excused by an agreement-between the party seeking the discovery and
Google-that did not include the bloggers.81 Unfortunately, the supreme
court's analysis begs the question of how the Rule 202 petitioner was sup-
posed to serve the anonymous bloggers whose identity he was trying to
discover from Google.82
In re Rockafellow presented a question of the interplay between Rule
202 and the privilege for trade secrets. 83 In this mandamus proceeding,
the real party in interest sought pre-suit discovery of the relators as po-
tential defendants in an anticipated suit regarding the unauthorized distri-
bution of hair-care products. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
the relators provided sufficient proof that the requested information con-
stituted trade secrets. 84 Because the real party in interest failed to pre-
sent any evidence that the trade secret information was essential to the
fair adjudication of its anticipated claims, the Rule 202 petition should
have been denied. 85
Finally, the sanction of exclusion of witnesses was at issue in two nota-
ble cases during the Survey period. In PopCap Games, Inc. v.
MumboJumbo, LLC, the trial court denied the plaintiff leave to supple-
ment its disclosures to designate a new damages expert after its original
expert's opinions were excluded as unreliable.8 6 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals agreed, holding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated good cause
or a lack of prejudice or surprise to the defendant. 87 In Dyer v. Cotton,
78. Id. at 932-333; see also City of Dallas v. Dallas Black Firefighters Ass'n, 353
S.W.3d 547, 557-58 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (Rule 202 deposition is unavailable
where there would be governmental immunity for the potential claim being investigated).
79. In re Does 1 & 2, 337 S.W.3d 862, 863 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 864-65.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 863-65.
83. In re Rockafellow, No. 07-11-00066-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5495, at *1-4 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo July 19, 2011, orig. proceeding).
84. Id. at * 9.
85. Id. at *12-14.
86. PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 717 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2011, pet. filed).
87. Id. at 719.
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on the other hand, the Texas First District Court of Appeals held that it
was not an abuse of discretion to allow one of defendant's witnesses to
testify, where the defendant had identified the witness as a person with
knowledge of relevant facts, but had listed his address and phone number
as "unknown." 88 The court of appeals relied on evidence from the defen-
dant regarding his unsuccessful efforts to locate the witness, as well as the
witness's own testimony that he had been out of Texas for work for sev-
eral years and had only returned shortly before the trial.8 9
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Although a trial court generally may not grant summary judgment on a
claim that is not the subject of that motion, in G & H Towing Co. v.
Magee, the Texas Supreme Court held that where such a claim "[was]
precluded as a matter of law" on other grounds that were advanced in the
summary judgment motion, the error was harmless. 90 In this personal-
injury suit, the trial court granted summary judgment for an individual
defendant, who the plaintiff claimed was negligent. The trial court also
granted summary judgment for that defendant's employer, who was al-
leged to be vicariously liable for the acts of its employee. Even though
the employer had not moved for summary judgment on that ground, the
supreme court held that because the employee was not negligent, his em-
ployer was likewise not vicariously liable as a matter of law for any al-
leged negligence, and any error in granting the summary judgment was,
therefore, harmless.91
The trial court in Webb v. Maldonado faced the unusual juxtaposition
of a party who first asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self in-
crimination in a deposition and then filed a "no evidence" summary judg-
ment motion.92 In response to that motion, the plaintiff attached only the
defendant's deposition, in which the defendant refused to answer any
questions based upon the assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. The
trial court granted the defendant's no-evidence summary judgment mo-
tion, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. 93 While the court of ap-
peals noted that a fact finder may draw a negative inference against a
party in a civil suit who asserts his Fifth Amendment rights, in the ab-
sence of some other evidence that was probative of the elements of the
plaintiff's claims, the defendant's invocation of the privilege alone was
insufficient to raise a fact question. 94
In re Guardianship of Patlan held that the time period during which
prior suits had been on file against the same defendant, based on the
88. Dyer v. Cotton, 333 S.W.3d 703, 717-18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
pet.).
89. Id.
90. G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297-98 (Tex. 2011).
91. Id. at 298.
92. Webb v. Maldonado, 331 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied).
93. Id. at 880.
94. Id. at 883.
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same facts and asserting the same claims, could be considered in deciding
whether an adequate time for discovery had passed before a no-evidence
summary judgment motion could properly be considered.95 In this case,
the plaintiff filed two suits against the defendant that were dismissed
without prejudice for want of prosecution. Seventeen days after the
plaintiff filed her third suit, the defendant filed a traditional and no-evi-
dence summary judgment motion. In response to that motion, the plain-
tiff moved for a continuance to conduct discovery. The trial court denied
the continuance and granted the summary judgment motion.96 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the time period during
which the prior suits were on file should have been included in deciding
whether there had been adequate time for discovery to be conducted. 97
IX. DISMISSAL
During the Survey period, the legislature amended the Texas Govern-
ment Code to direct the Texas Supreme Court to "adopt rules to provide
for the dismissal of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact on
motion and without evidence." 98 The new rules will require that such a
motion to dismiss must be granted or denied within forty-five days after it
is filed.99 The amended statute also requires the supreme court to adopt
rules "to promote the prompt, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of
civil actions" in which the amount in controversy is less than $100,000.100
As of this writing, these new rules have not yet been promulgated.
Once they are in place, it will remain to be seen whether the motion-to-
dismiss procedure, foreign to state court practice, will merely be a tool for
weeding out frivolous lawsuits or whether it will develop into a more ex-
acting examination of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, similar to the
standards articulated in the recent case law under federal Rule
12(b)(6).10 Practitioners on both sides of the bar will have a keen inter-
est in the answer to this question because a companion amendment to the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code enacted in the last legislative
session requires trial courts to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party on a motion to dismiss.102
95. In re Guardianship of Patlan, 350 S.W.3d 189, 196-97 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2011, no pet.)
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id. at 196-97.
98. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(g) (West Supp. 2011).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 22.004(h).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stat-
ing that adequate pleading requires more than "labels and conclusions"; instead, it "must
contain sufficient factual [allegations that, if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.").
102. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.021 (West Supp. 2011). This fee-shifting
provision is all that survived of the controversial "loser pays" proposals that were intro-
duced during the 2011 legislative session.
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The Texas Supreme Court in Epps v. Fowler addressed the effect of the
plaintiffs' non-suit without prejudice on the defendants' claim that they
were entitled to attorneys' fees as the prevailing parties. 10 3 In this real
estate dispute, the plaintiffs sued the sellers of their home, claiming the
home had undisclosed defects. In response, the defendants sought to re-
cover their attorney's fees both as a sanction and under the parties' ear-
nest-money contract, which contained a prevailing-party-attorneys'-fee
provision. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a notice of nonsuit without
prejudice. The trial court then awarded the defendants their attorneys'
fees, and the plaintiffs appealed.104
The supreme court first noted that if a plaintiff nonsuits a case with
prejudice, res judicata alters the legal relationship between the parties,
and the defendant would therefore be deemed the prevailing party and
entitled to recover attorneys's fees if a contractual or statutory basis ex-
ists for claiming such an award.10 5 However, where a plaintiff nonsuits its
claims without prejudice, the legal relationship between the parties is not
altered, since the plaintiff would be allowed to refile suit.' 0 6 The supreme
court, therefore, rejected a rule that the defendant has prevailed when-
ever the plaintiff nonsuits without prejudice, which would discourage
plaintiffs from abandoning claims that they determined lacked sufficient
merit to prosecute and incentivize them instead "to roll the dice and hope
for a favorable judgment rather than accept an inevitable judgment for
attorney's fees."'01 7 Rather, the supreme court held that the defendant
may be considered the prevailing party only if, on the defendant's mo-
tion, the trial court determines that "the nonsuit was taken to avoid an
unfavorable ruling on the merits.' 08 In making this determination, trial
courts should rely, as much as possible, on the existing record and affida-
vit testimony, considering live testimony only on rare occasions. 10 9 The
opinion listed several scenarios that might show that a plaintiff's intent in
dismissing the suit without prejudice was to avoid an adverse finding.110
Conversely, evidence that the suit seemed meritorious when filed, and
only later were flaws uncovered, may indicate that the defendant is not
entitled to recover fees as the prevailing party." 1
Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires a
plaintiff in a suit against certain licensed or registered professionals to file
a certificate of merit in connection with pursuing a claim against a cov-
ered professional. 1 2 In CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Home-
owner's Ass'n, the plaintiff failed to file the requisite certificate, and the
103. Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. 2011).
104. Id. at 865.
105. Id. at 868-869.
106. Id. at 869.
107. Id. at 869.
108. Id. at 870.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 870-871.
111. Id. at 871.
112. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a) (West 2011).
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defendant therefore moved to dismiss the suit with prejudice. 113 The
plaintiff subsequently nonsuited all of its claims against all parties. The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that its
prior motion for a dismissal with prejudice under Chapter 150 constituted
a claim for affirmative relief that survived the plaintiff's absolute right to
take a nonsuit under Rule 162.114
X. JURY PRACTICE
Austin v. Weems addressed the issue of defense counsel's use of a hand
gesture, rubbing his fingers against his thumb during closing arguments,
allegedly to signify that a witness had been bribed to change his testi-
mony.115 The plaintiff's counsel did not object to the gesture when it was
made, and the reporter's record did not reflect that it had occurred. In-
stead, the issue was first raised in the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for
new trial. The Texas First District Court of Appeals concluded that, be-
cause the plaintiff did not object to the gesture at the time, it could only
be a reversible error if it was incurably harmful.1 16 The court of appeals
held that the gesture, even if it was made, did not rise to this level. 117 The
court noted that there was no direct allegation of bribery, and the accom-
panying statements in the argument were "not so extreme" that they
would have caused a reasonable juror to render a verdict contrary to
what she otherwise would have rendered.1 18
XI. JUDGMENTS
In Lucas v. Clark, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer
default judgment to the extent it awarded unliquidated damages for lost
profits based solely upon unanswered requests for admissions "embed-
ded" within the body of the petition. 1 9 The court of appeals held that
the requests, which sought the admission of ultimate fact issues, were not
a proper use of this discovery tool and would not, therefore, support the
lost-profits award. 120 The court also held that the defendant did not
waive the error by failing to object to the requests as improper in the trial
court.121 Absent any other evidence in the record beyond the unan-
swered requests for admissions, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
not sufficiently proven its alleged damages. 122
113. CTL/Thompson Tex. LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Ass'n, 352 S.W.3d 854, 855
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. filed).
114. Id. at 856-57; TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
115. Austin v. Weems, 337 S.W.3d 415, 427-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
pet.).
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 429.
118. Id.
119. Lucas v. Clark, 347 S.W.3d 800, 804-05 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
120. Id. at 804-06.




XII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In In re Smith, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that mandamus is
not an appropriate mechanism to review a trial court's entry of an order
granting a new trial when the trial court has articulated the reasons for its
order. 123 In this car accident case, the trial court originally entered a
take-nothing judgment based on the jury's verdict.12 4 The trial court then
granted the plaintiff's motion for new trial, stating that the jury's finding
was "so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
[so] as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust."'1 2 5 After the trial court
refused to vacate its order granting the motion for new trial, the defen-
dant sought a writ of mandamus. 126 The court of appeals denied the re-
quested relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court has required only
that trial courts specify their grounds for granting a motion for new
trial.127 Once the trial court has satisfied this obligation to articulate the
basis for its decision, mandamus is not proper to review the merits of that
decision.1 28
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
In In re Thompson, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a district
attorney had standing to move to recuse the trial judge in a proceeding,
filed by relatives of a man convicted of murder, that requested the judge
to convene a court of inquiry regarding the alleged unlawful circum-
stances of his conviction. 129 The relatives complained that Rule 18a
1 3 °
only permits a "party" to file a recusal motion, and the district attorney
was not a party to the case.131 The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, noting that part of the relief they sought was a declaration that
their relative had been wrongfully convicted.1 32 Because the State of
Texas had an interest in this requested judicial declaration, which would
have been inconsistent with the judgment of conviction it had previously
obtained, the district attorney was the appropriate person to represent
the State's interest in connection with the requested court of inquiry.
133
123. In re Smith, 332 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, orig. proceeding).
124. Id. at 706.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 709 (citing In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290
S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009)).
128. Id. at 709.
129. In re Thompson, 330 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, orig. proceeding).
A "court of inquiry" is a proceeding to determine whether "illegal activity has occurred."
Id. at 420 (Puryear, J., dissenting). Now governed by Chapter 52 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, "[c]ourts of inquiry have a long and troubled history in Texas jurispru-
dence." Id.
130. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
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XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Guaranty Insurance Services, Inc. addressed the propriety of the
disqualification of a law firm that had tried, but failed, to prevent one of
its recently hired legal assistants from working on a case that he had
worked on two years before, while employed with the opposing law
firm.134 In In re Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P., a case dis-
cussed in the 2011 Survey,' 35 the Texas Supreme Court held that a non-
lawyer's work on both sides of a case disqualified the second law firm
when it had failed to take reasonable steps to effectively screen the non-
lawyer from working on or having contact with the case. 136 In Guaranty
Insurance, however, the Texas Supreme Court held that "disqualification
was not warranted. 1 37 Unlike the situation in Columbia, the supreme
court noted that the second law firm's screening procedures in this case
were "exemplary."'1 38 The mere fact that those procedures failed in this
instance to prevent the legal assistant from working on the case was not
determinative.139 Instead, the supreme court clarified that, if the non-
lawyer has actually worked on the matter, the presumption that he has
shared confidential information with his new employer cannot be rebut-
ted "unless the assigning lawyer should not have known of the
conflict."1 40
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
In In re Reece, the Texas Supreme Court decided, as a matter of first
impression, that a trial court may not hold a litigant in contempt for per-
jury committed during a deposition unless the perjury obstructs the oper-
ation of the court.14' The supreme court began its analysis by discussing
the different types of contempt, noting that "[c]ontempt may occur in the
134. In re Guar. Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130, 131-32 (Tex. 2011).
135. Donald Colleluori et al., Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial, 64 SMU L. REV. 137,
150-51 (2011).
136. In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Tex. 2010).
137. Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 132.
138. Id. at 133. These procedures included the firm: running its own conflicts check;
requiring the prospective employee to identify potential conflicts from his prior employ-
ment; restricting the employee's access to documents related to the matters that had been
identified; and instructing the employee, during his orientation and through an employee
handbook and confidentiality agreement, not to disclose confidential information gained
through previous employment and requiring him to notify his supervising attorney immedi-
ately if he became aware of a matter he had previously worked on. Id. at 132.
139. Id. at 135.
140. Id. (emphasis in original).
141. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 362-63, 369 (Tex. 2011). "The relator [had first]
challenged his confinement by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal
Appeals, but that court declined to exercise its jurisdiction... [becausel of the civil nature
of the case." Id. at 363. As a result, a large part of the majority's opinion, and all of Justice
Willett's dissent, was devoted to a separate jurisdictional question: "whether [the supreme
court] should exercise [its] mandamus jurisdiction to provide a forum for a civil litigant
who is deprived of liberty pursuant to a court's contempt order, and the Court of Criminal




presence of a court," which is referred to as direct contempt, or "outside
the court's presence," which is referred to as constructive contempt. 142 In
addition, contempt is further divided into classifications of either civil or
criminal. "[C]ivil contempt is 'remedial and coercive in nature,' [and the
party] carries the keys to the jail cell in his or her pocket since the con-
finement is conditioned on obedience with the court's order."'1 43
"[C]riminal contempt[, however,] is punitive in nature-'the contemnor is
being punished for some completed act which affronted the dignity and
authority of the court.' "144
Here, the relator "admitted to lying outside the trial court's presence
during a deposition, and the purpose of the contempt judgment was to
punish him for this misdeed rather than to coerce him into complying
with an order. 1 45 Thus, the trial court found the relator in constructive,
criminal contempt. The supreme court held, however, that where an al-
leged constructive contempt does not involve the violation of a court or-
der, it must actually "obstruct the court in the performance of its
duties. '146 In this case, the supreme court found that the relator's mis-
statements during his deposition did not rise to this level.1 47 Rather, al-
though the supreme court agreed that the behavior was "reprehensible"
and did cause the opposing litigant additional difficulty, delay, and ex-
pense in the discovery process, there was no evidence that the perjury
actually obstructed the court itself.' 48
Moreover, the supreme court cautioned that in the context of a deposi-
tion, the standard for constructive contempt should be very narrow for
several reasons. 149 First, the supreme court was concerned about creating
a system where litigants and their attorneys "scour transcripts, searching
for any misstatement for the sole purpose of accusing the opponent of
contempt and ultimately securing the opponent's confinement.' 150 Sec-
ond, a trial court has several other options to discourage perjury during a
deposition without resorting to restraining a person's liberty in a con-
tempt proceeding. Namely, because "a deposition is a discovery tool,"
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate "a range of [possible]
sanctions for discovery abuse.' 51 In this case, the trial court could have
"imposed sanctions ranging from payment [of the opposing litigant's] ex-
penses ... , including attorney's fees, to rendering a default judgment."'1 52
Finally, the supreme court explained that the trial court also had "the
option of referring a perjury allegation to the district attorney for crimi-




146. Id. at 366-67.
147. Id. at 367.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 368.
150. Id.
151. ld. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 215).
152. Id.
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nal prosecution. 1 53
In Cunningham v. Zurich American Insurance Co., the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals considered, among other things, whether an e-mail con-
stituted a binding Rule 11 agreement. 154 Zurich argued in a summary
judgment motion that the e-mail was not enforceable because it was not
signed, as required by Rule 11. The court of appeals first noted that
"[t]he fact that the email [was] an electronic document [did not, by itself,]
prevent it from being enforceable under Rule 11 because ... under the
uniform electronic transactions act, a contract may be enforceable despite
the use of an electronic record in its formation, and '[i]f a law requires a
signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.""' 55 The statute de-
fines an electronic signature as "an electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to . . . a record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record.' 56 To satisfy this requirement, the electronic
signature must in fact be "the act of the person," which is determined by
"the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,
execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and oth-
erwise as provided by law."' 57
In this case, the e-mail that constituted the alleged Rule 11 agreement
did not "contain a graphical representation of [the attorney's] signature,
an 's/' followed by [the attorney's] typed name, or any other symbol or
mark that unequivocally indicated a signature. '158 The e-mail did include
the attorney's name and contact information at the bottom. 59 However,
the court of appeals found no evidence that this "signature block was
typed by [the attorney as opposed to being] generated automatically by
[the] email [program].' 60 "If [the attorney] did personally type the sig-
nature block at the bottom of the email, nothing in the email suggest[ed]
that she did so with the intention that [it was to] be her signature."' 61
Accordingly, the court held that the e-mail was not an enforceable Rule
11 agreement.' 62
153. Id.
154. Cunningham v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 352 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2011, pet. filed). See TEX. R. Civ. P. 11:
Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or
parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing,
signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in
open court and entered of record.
155. Cunningham, 352 S.W.3d at 529 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.007
(West 2009)).
156. TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.002(8) (West 2009).
157. Id. § 322.009(a)-(b).
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XVI. CONCLUSION
The Texas Legislature has directed the Texas Supreme Court to con-
tinue efforts to streamline the litigation process with the goal of increas-
ing efficiency and cost-effectiveness. How these efforts will fare remains
to be seen. In the meantime, the Texas Supreme Court and intermediate
courts of appeals continue to create an expanding body of precedent to
guide Texas trial courts in properly managing their dockets under the ex-
isting procedural rules.
